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Abstract
Evidence supports the notion that those who grow up to be patient do better than those who do not. Parents
can inculcate the virtue of delayed gratification in their children by taking the right actions. We study a model
in which parents, for selfish reasons, invest resources to raise patient children. In the model, patience raises the
marginal return to human capital acquisition giving the patient young an incentive to spend more on their
own education at the expense of investment in their own progeny’s patience. This dynamic generates
intergenerational patience cycles.
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Abstract
There is a large body of evidence supporting the notion that a) those who grow up to be patient
(forward-looking) do better in life compared to those who do not, and b) parents can inculcate
the virtue of delayed gratification in their children by taking the right sort of actions. We study
a dynamic model in which parents, for selfish reasons, invest resources to raise patient children.
Patience raises the marginal return to human capital accumulation. The patient young do better
in school, and hence, get more education but scrimp on investing in their own progeny’s patience.
This dynamic can generate intergenerational patience cycles. Generations coming of age with little
patience will invest more in the productive capacity of their children, while those with greater
patience invest more in their own productive capacity.
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“Patience is the companion of wisdom.”
– St. Augustine
1 Introduction
The ability to delay gratification is a highly desirable quality, one that is strongly correlated
with success and income later in life. In a classic 1960s study (see Lehrer, 2009), researcher
Michael Mischel oﬀered a group of hungry four-year olds one marshmallow as an immediate
reward, but, if they waited for him to return (after about 20 minutes), they could have
two marshmallows instead. Fourteen years later, the longitudinal study demonstrated
significant diﬀerences between these two groups. The children who delayed gratification
and waited exhibited more positive and persistent traits as young adults; they were more
self-motivated and were able to delay immediate gratification in order to pursue longer
term goals. On the other hand, the children who chose one marshmallow exhibited traits
of greater indecisiveness and mistrust of others later in life; they were less self-confident
and often more troubled in general. Comparing SAT scores, Mischel found that students
that chose 1 marshmallow scored an average of 210 points lower than the 2 marshmallow
students. The overall message of this famed study is clear: those who grow up to be patient
eventually do better in life.
To some extent, the ability to delay gratification has its roots in genetics, but mostly,
it is a trait passed actively from parents to children. Parents routinely spend substantial
resources in the form of time, eﬀort, and energy to inculcate the virtues of waiting.1 By
teaching (or arranging to teach) a child how to play the violin or the piano, a parent
is indirectly teaching the child the benefit of waiting for future rewards (such as, the
accolades and attention following music performance). Similarly, by encouraging a child
1Several parenting-help websites oﬀered such advice as: a) “When a 3-year-old asks for a cookie: "You
can have one cookie now, or you can pick up your toys and have two cookies when you finish.", b) “When
a 5-year-old wants to watch a favorite movie: "There isn’t time to watch all of it now, but if you wait until
after supper, we can watch it together and I’ll make popcorn."”
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to take on tough problems in arithmetic, a parent is teaching her to substitute, implicitly,
the immediate gratification of playing with her dolls for the delayed gratification of joining
Harvard some day.2
This desire to raise a patient child is partly motivated by altruistic feelings on the part
of the parent. Parents want the best for their children, and if patience is a virtue, their
children should have more of it. Presumably though, the parent also benefits directly from
having a patient child.3 Clearly, parents are happier if their child/adolescent is financially
responsible, saves for his/her own future, delays sexual activity, and so on.
The child, as she comes of age, is presumably also happier and definitely more successful
if raised to delay gratification. Bembenutty and Karabenick (2004) showed that academic
success is largely dependent on students’ ability to resist temptations of immediate gratifi-
cation in order to increase the likelihood of accomplishing more important long-term goals.
David Brooks (2006) describes the same in this fashion: “Young people who can delay
gratification can sit through sometimes boring classes to get a degree. They can perform
rote tasks in order to, say, master a language. They can avoid drugs and alcohol. For
people without self-control skills, however, school is a series of failed ordeals. No wonder
they drop out. Life is a parade of foolish decisions: teenage pregnancy, drug use, gambling,
truancy and crime.”
This paper incorporates the aforediscussed ideas into a simple reduced-form model.
2From Robert E. Lucas Lectures on Economic Growth (2001): “In my neighborhood in Chicago I bring
my shirts to a laundry operated by a Korean woman, recently arrived, whose English is barely adequate to
enable her to conduct her business. Her shop is open from 7 to 7, six days a week. As I enter, her 3-year-old
daughter is seated on the counter being drilled in arithmetic–which she is very good at and clearly enjoys
enormously. Fifteen years from now this girl will be beginning her studies at Chicago or Caltech, alongside
the children of professors and Mayflower descendants.”
3As one of the parenting-help websites argued “Teaching them how to wait for things they want could
mean the diﬀerence between raising a child who successfully launches someday - and ends up living on his
own, rather than back in his old bedroom - and one who does not.”
Another website brought up the following example: “Rick and his wife, Corinne, found it diﬃcult to go
anywhere with the kids. If they weren’t fighting in the car, the boys took oﬀ in three diﬀerent directions
the moment they were let loose in public. Rather than go on family outings and deal with Peter, Rhys, and
Caleb’s bolting, Rick and Corinne chose to stay home most of the time. They felt like prisoners in their
own home.”
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Consider a dynamic economy in which agents spend valuable resources (invest in patience
capital) to increase the discount factor of their children. Children take their own discount
factor as given and decide how much (costly) education to acquire above and beyond a
given baseline level. More education increases the amount of marketable human capital;
ceteris paribus, the more patient you are, the higher is the contribution to human capital of
an additional year of schooling. Higher human capital translates into higher future income.
The music lesson example provides a useful illustration of the type of broad eﬀects
that instilling patience in a child may have, which we attempt to model here. Patience
can be viewed as part and parcel of learning a skill set — music lessons develop a child’s
concentration, abstract thinking, manual dexterity, and, along the way, the ability to delay
gratification. Our treatment of patience captures this notion — namely, it enhances skill
sets that individuals may acquire later in life as well as sets the stage for the child to grow
up with a more forward (or patient) versus immediate outlook on life. These, we believe,
are desirable traits for parents to nurture in their children.
A stripped-down version of this model is able to generate interesting generational cycles
in patience. For example, consider a two-period cycle in which an agent starts oﬀ life with
a high level of patience. This raises the return to getting an education, and she substitutes
out of investing in her child’s patience to pay for this extra education for herself. Her future
income is higher but, now, her child starts oﬀ with low patience and has low income.
These cycles have potential to speak to a well-documented fact (Carliner, 1980; Borjas,
1993): earnings of second-generation workers in the U.S. (and elsewhere) are substantially
higher than those of the first and the third. Existing work has suggested that it is the lack
of opportunities for the first and the lack of motivation of the third that explain why the
second generation does better. Instead, we argue it is the first generation that spends time
and resources to teach the second generation to delay gratification (see footnote 2 above).
This raises the return to schooling for the patient second generation. They choose to get
a lot of education but scrimp on investing in patience for their own children; somewhat
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tongue-in-cheek, they end up raising the proverbial underachieving professor’s kid.
The notion of endogenous discount rates goes back to Uzawa (1968). The idea that
patience is an investment good was introduced in Becker and Mulligan (1997). In their
setup, an individual at the start of life takes a rational decision to invest in patience, which
in turn, determines the discount factor he uses for the rest of his life. In our formulation,
which is much closer to that of Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), parents make the investment
in their child’s patience; subsequently, the child takes his own discount factor as given.4
Another point of departure for us is that parental involvement in the preference formation
of their child is not motivated by altruistic concerns. The current paper is also thematically
connected to Akabayashi (2006) and Bhatt and Ogaki (2008), although the focus of our
paper diﬀers sharply from theirs. In Akabayashi (2006), a child’s discount factor depends
on her human capital which, among other things, depends on how much time the parent
spends with the child. In Bhatt and Ogaki (2008), a young agent’s discount factor depends
on her consumption as a small child, and altruistic parents can manipulate their child’s
discount factor by holding back on transfers (“tough love”).
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the general model environ-
ment, including some basic properties on agents’ expenditures on education and patience
capital. In Section 3, we discuss the equilibrium properties of the model. Here we establish
conditions which ensure a unique steady state obtains. We also explore the possibility
that the model can support 2-period equilibrium limit cycles and provide a few numerical
examples of cycle equilibria. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
We consider a simple and highly-stylized model economy populated by endless cohorts of
three-period lived overlapping generations. Label these three periods of life as childhood,
4See Skog (2001) for a critique of the Becker-Mulligan (1997) idea.
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youth, and old-age. Let t = 1, 2, ...,∞ denote time.
A young agent is endowed with y units of a perishable consumption good, and can
work when old. There are no saving instruments. When young, an agent has exactly one
oﬀspring. The child makes no decisions and does not care about consumption.
In addition to caring about consumption during youth and old age, the agent receives
utility (warm glow) from raising a patient child. Specifically, let ct (xt) denote consumption
when young (old) for an agent born at date t − 1, and let βt denote the discount factor
between t and t+ 1. Then, her utility function is given by
U
¡
ct, xt, βt+1;βt
¢
= u (ct) + βt u (xt) + θ v
¡
βt+1
¢
,
where θ > 0 is a parameter; additional structure on the functions u and v will be imposed
below. A young agent at date t takes βt as given but cares about influencing the β of her
child — captured by the function v (·) . A child raised with a high β is more forward-looking
(can delay gratification) compared to one raised with low β. A young parent invests an
amount pt (henceforth “patience capital”) towards the raising of a more patient child.
Aside from an innate endowment of some patience capital, we assume that the child’s β
is entirely shaped by the amount spent by her parents; in particular, βt+1 = g (pt) , where
g (0) > 0. Additional assumptions on the function g (·) are made below.
The idea that parents shape the discount factor of a child is similar in spirit to that
of Becker and Mulligan (1997). In our setup, however, parents are not altruistic towards
their children. They simply receive a warm glow from raising a “more patient” child;
specifically, they are assumed to get direct utility from raising a child whose consumption
is more tilted towards old age than youth. In eﬀect, the parent is spending resources
to produce a calmer, less-fidgety child who will delay gratification. Examples of such
investments include teaching children to wait their turn, taking them to music lessons
(where the reward of playing in front of an audience comes only after prolonged practice
and perseverance), teaching them chess (a game that requires patience), inculcating good
reading habits (encouraging them to look forward to the dénouement of the story’s plot),
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and so on. The parent reaps a direct benefit of having such a child, presumably in the
form of more pleasant restaurant visits, better grades in school, less need of disciplining,
less behavioral problems, and the like. Below, we model how the child benefits from being
raised patient.
We think of the agent’s young-age endowment, y, as the goods-equivalent of basic skills
or human capital that she acquires with relatively little eﬀort or investment (say, educa-
tion up to high school). An agent may use part of this endowment to acquire additional
‘marketable’ human capital — call it higher education — achieved by incurring educational
expenses, et, at a unit cost φ. We assume expenses on education gets converted into mar-
ketable human capital next period via a production function:
ht+1 = h (et;βt) .
An old agent with human capital ht+1 earns income wht+1, where w > 0 is a parameter.
The idea behind the formulation is simple: patient children do better in school. A
patient student generates more human capital (for the same education expense) when
compared to an impatient student. Here lies the benefit to a child from being raised to
delay gratification; such patience is rewarded by the education system (in the form of more
human capital accumulated), and indirectly by the marketplace.
We collect all the technical assumptions on the functions u, v, g,and h below. These are
maintained in all that follows.
Assumptions
A1 u (·) is strictly concave, with lim
c→0
u0 (c) =∞.
A2 v (·) is concave.
A3 g (·) is concave, with g (0) > 0.
A4 h1 > 0, h11 < 0, h12 ≥ 0, and h2 ≥ 0 with lim
e→0
h1 (e;β) =∞ for β > 0.
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Assumption A3 posits that agents are born with some innate patience. We include
some additional assumptions on these functions in the analysis below. In passing, note
that since a parent determines her child’s β, and this choice enters the parent’s utility only
through a warm-glow eﬀect, our framework is general enough to permit scale economies in
the production of human capital.
2.2 The agent’s problem
Given βt, a young agent’s decision problem at date t is as follows:
max
ct,xt,βt+1
u (ct) + βtu (xt) + θv
¡
βt+1
¢
subject to
C1 ct + φet + pt ≤ y
C2 xt ≤ w ht+1
C3 ht+1 = h (et;βt) ; βt+1 = g (pt)
C4 ct ≥ 0, xt ≥ 0, pt ≥ 0
Assuming interior solutions for all choice variables, the first-order conditions for the
agent’s problem are
F1 ct : u0 (ct) = λyt
F2 xt : βt u0 (xt) = λot
F3 pt : θ v0
¡
βt+1
¢
g0 (pt) = λyt
F4 et : φλyt = wλot h1 (et;βt)
where λit is the Lagrangian multiplier on the resource constraint of an agent in her ith
stage of life.
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Using F1 and F2, F4 can be written as:
φu0 (ct) = wβt u
0 (xt) h1 (et;βt) . (1)
Using F1, F3 can be written as:
θ v0
¡
βt+1
¢
g0 (pt) = u0 (ct) . (2)
Parenthetically, (1) equates the marginal cost of education (in terms of forgone utility,
φu0 (ct)) with the marginal benefit of education: higher future wage earnings w h1 (et;βt) ,
which, in terms of future utility, is wβtu0 (xt)h1 (et;βt) .
Note that a parental choice of investment in patience aﬀects the right hand side of
her child’s marginal condition (1) in two ways — first, directly, through its eﬀect on her
discount factor βt — how she views future consumption relative to current consumption
— and second, through the eﬀect patience has on the human capital production and the
eﬀectiveness of a marginal investment in education, h1 (et;βt). This latter eﬀect is one of
the novelties of our framework. Our treatment recognizes the fact that instilling greater
patience in one’s child may do more than simply shaping the child’s discount factor β — it
can, in fact, enhance the child’s own cognitive abilities, raising, as we note, the marginal
benefits of education.
Using the budget constraints and the technologies, we can rewrite (1) and (2) as:
φu0 (y − φet − pt) = wg (pt−1)u0 (wh (et; g (pt−1)))h1 (et; g (pt−1)) . (3)
θv0 (g (pt)) g0 (pt) = u0 (y − φet − pt) . (4)
This last equation implicitly defines a function, et = e (pt) . The following lemma summa-
rizes some results concerning the function e (pt) .
Lemma 1 Suppose lim
p→0
v0 (g (p)) g0 (p) =∞ and that Assumptions A1-A4 hold. Then,
i. φe0 (pt) ≤ −1.
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ii. There exists a y∗, y∗ < y such that lim
p→y∗
φe (p) = 0, and
iii. lim
p→0
φe (p) = y.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 indicates two things. First, it says that a parent’s expenditure on
her own education is a decreasing function of her choice of patience capital for her child.
The result is not too surprising, considering investment in one’s own education competes
directly for resources with patience capital in the agent’s budget constraint, C1. Second, it
states that total expenditures, pt+ φe (pt) , are decreasing in pt. This suggests that, ceteris
paribus, a unit increase in spending on patience will result in a proportionately larger
reduction in expenditures on education — the diﬀerence is spent on first-period consumption.
Part (ii) follows directly from (4) and the fact that the derivative v0 (g (p)) g0 (p) is bounded
at p = y, while u0 (y − φet − pt) is unbounded if lim
p→y
φe (p) + p = y, i.e., if lim
p→y
φe (p) = 0.
Part (iii) follows from the fact that lim
p→0
v0 (g (p)) g0 (p) =∞.
A proof of Lemma 1 and of all other propositions to follow may be found in the Ap-
pendix.
3 Equilibria
3.1 The law of motion and steady-state
Using e (pt) , (3) implicitly defines a law-of-motion for patience capital, pt = P (pt−1):
φu0 (y − φe (pt)− pt) = wg (pt−1)u0 (wh (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)))h1 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)) . (5)
It serves to connect an agent’s discount rate with that of her child’s.
Given an initial stock of patience, p0, an equilibrium can be summarized by a sequence
{pt}∞t=0 , 0 ≤ pt < y that satisfies (5), where e (pt) is implicitly defined by (4). Below, we
establish conditions that ensure the existence of a steady state equilibrium. We will turn
to the issue of non-stationary equilibria in Section 3.2.
A steady state p∗ satisfies
φu0 (y − φe (p∗)− p∗) = wg (p∗)u0 (wh (e (p∗) ; g (p∗)))h1 (e (p∗) ; g (p∗)) . (6)
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Proposition 1 There exists a steady-state, p∗ ∈ (0, y∗) . If, in addition, h2 (e, p) = 0, the
steady state is unique.
Interestingly, it is easy to establish uniqueness of the steady state if h is independent
of β; of course, the latter is a suﬃcient condition.
We are now in a position to investigate further the dynamics of patience pt. Diﬀeren-
tiating both sides of (5), it is easy to show that
P 0 (pt−1) ≡ dptdpt−1 = −
N
D ,
where
N ≡ [w2g (pt−1)u00 (xt)h1 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1))h2 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1))
+wg (pt−1)u0 (xt)h12 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)) + wu0 (xt)h1 (et; g (pt−1))] g0 (pt−1)
and
D ≡ φu00 (ct)
¡
φe0 (pt) + 1
¢
+w2g (pt−1)u00 (xt) (h1 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)))2 e0 (pt)
+wg (pt−1)u0 (xt)h11 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)) e0 (pt) > 0.
with ct = y − φet − pt and xt = wh (et; g (pt−1)) .
Proposition 2 If h2 (e, β) = 0, i.e., if patience does not influence the accumulation of
human capital,
dpt
dpt−1
≤ 0
implying the law of motion for p is non-increasing everywhere.
Clearly, D > 0 follows from the concavity properties of u (·) and Part (i) of Lemma 1
— the fact that e0 (pt) < 0 and φe0 (pt) + 1 ≤ 0 over the domain of p. In general, the sign
of N is not conclusive — the first term inside the square brackets is negative; if h12 > 0,
the other two terms are positive. In the special case where h2 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)) = 0, N is
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positive, and the law-of-motion for p is downward sloped over the entire domain of p. In
this case, combining the insight from Proposition 1, we know that there is a unique steady
state and the slope at the steady state is negative.
What happens when h12 > 0? The following additional assumptions impose more struc-
ture on preferences and technology and help sign the slope of the law of motion for p.
Assumptions
A5 u (c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1; u (c) = ln c, when σ = 1
A6 h (et;βt) = Ae
μ
t β
η
t , with A > 0, 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1 and η ≥ 0.
Using A5-A6, the budget constraint, xt = wAe
μ
t β
η
t and the fact that wg (pt−1)h2 (e (pt) ; g (pt−1)) =
ηwAeμt β
η
t = ηxt, it is possible to compute N as
N = (−ση + 1 + η) (xt)−σ wμAeμ−1t βηt g0 (pt−1) .
Corollary 1 Suppose A5-A6 hold. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for dptdpt−1 ≤
0 is 1 + η (1− σ) > 0.
Note that if A5-A6 hold, the sign of dptdpt−1 is either positive or negative depending on
1 + η (1− σ) S 0, i.e., the time-map P cannot exhibit any sort of non-monotonicity. It
deserves mention here that σ ≤ 1 is necessary to obtain dptdpt−1 ≤ 0.
Assuming A5-A6 hold, we can write the two conditions necessary for an interior opti-
mum as:
φ (y − φet − pt)−σ = g (pt−1) (wAeμt g (pt−1)
η)
−σ wμAeμ−1t g (pt−1)
η (7)
and
θν 0g0 (pt) = (y − φet − pt)−σ ,
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Figure 1: Two-Period Limit Cycles in Patience Capital
where, for ease of presentation, we define ν0 ≡ ν0 (g (pt)). It is easy to verify that the
equilibrium law of motion for p is implicitly given by
pt = y − φ
Ã
μg (pt−1)1+η(1−σ) (wA)1−σ
φθν0g0 (pt)
! 1
1−μ(1−σ)
−
¡
θν0g0 (pt)
¢− 1σ , (8)
and the expression for education expenses is given by
et =
Ã
μg (pt−1) (wAg (pt−1)η)
1−σ
φθν 0g0 (pt)
! 1
1−μ(1−σ)
. (9)
3.2 Two-period limit cycles
A technical implication of a law of motion that is decreasing monotonically is that cycles
of periodicity greater than two are not possible. (For that, a necessary condition is the
law of motion should be non-monotonic) Next, we consider the possibility of generating
two-period limit cycles. Such cycles are pairs po and pe (po 6= pe) such that pt = po (at an
odd date) and pt = pe (at an even date) for all t. Figure 1 depicts such a cycle equilibrium.
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A suﬃcient condition to obtain two-period limit cycles in a neighborhood of the steady
state, p∗, is
dpt
dpt−1
|p∗ = −1.
Below, we investigate the implications of this condition in the context of an analytically
transparent example.
From here on, assume ν (·) and g (·) are linear functions, and that σ = 1 [u (·) is the
log function]. 5Then using (8), we can get
pt = Λ− Γ g (pt−1) (10)
where Λ ≡ y− 1θν0g0 , and Γ ≡
μ
θν0g0 = −μΛ+μy. > 0. It follows from Corollary 1 that
dpt
dpt−1 ≤
0.
Two-period cycle equilibria exist if Γg0 = 1; i.e., if μ = θν 0. Assuming μ = θν0,
the right-hand side of (10) maps the interval [0,Λ− Γg (0)] into itself, with a fixed point
p∗ = Λ−Γg(0)2 . In order to ensure 0 ≤ pt ≤ y holds and the discount factor, βt, satisfies
0 ≤ βt < 1, we require: i) 0 < Λ − Γg (0) < y, and ii) g (Λ− Γg (0)) < 1. Clearly,
Λ − Γg (0) < y is satisfied for all increasing functions ν (·) and g (·) with g (0) ≥ 0, since
Λ− Γg (0) = y − 1+μg(0)θν0g0 . Let
g (p) = ϕ+ πp, ϕ > 0, π > 0.
Then g0 (p) = π and g00 (p) = 0; the condition 0 < Λ−Γg (0) is assured if ϕμ+1 < μπy, given
the assumption that μ = θν 0. In order for βt ≤ 1 over the entire domain [0,Λ− Γg (0)] , we
require πΛ < 1, i.e., πμy < (1 + μ) .6
5The assumption here that ν (·) and g (·) are linear functions does not satisfy the all the conditions of
A1-A6 and in Lemma 1; the latter provide suﬃcient conditions to ensure the existence of a steady-state.
6Since the law of motion is downward sloped, pt is greatest when pt−1 = 0. At that point, p =
Λ− Γg (0) = Λ− Γϕ, or twice the steady-state value p∗. Evaluating g at this point, we have g (Λ− Γϕ) =
ϕ+ π (Λ− ϕΓ) = πΛ, since πΓ = 1.
Note that the condition πΛ < 1 is suﬃcient to ensure βt ≤ 1 for all t. If this condition is not met,
one can restrict the analysis to a subset of the domain [0,Λ− Γg (0)] that ensures βt ≤ 1. That set is
14
A two-period cycle, in this instance, is characterized by a pair (po, pe) that satisfies the
following:
po = Λ− Γg (pe) (11)
pe = Λ− Γg (po)
Clearly, a pair with po = pe obtains at the steady state, p∗. The following proposition states
that a two-cycle exists.
Proposition 3 For any po ∈ (0,Λ− Γg (0)) , other than the steady state, p∗, there exists
a pe 6= po such that (po, pe) satisfies (11).
The cycle in patience capital investment naturally induces generational cycles in other
important macro aggregates, such as education expenditures, output, and even growth
rates. To see this, notice that expenditures on education satisfy, φet = Γg (pt−1) implying
ee =
Γ
φ
g (po) ; eo =
Γ
φ
g (pe)
where the subscript e and o refer to even and odd dates, respectively. Similarly, noting
that output at date t is defined as Yt ≡ h
¡
et−1;βt−1
¢
, we then have
Ye = A
µ
Γ
φ
¶μ
g (pe)μ+η ; Yo = A
µ
Γ
φ
¶μ
g (po)μ+η
and from these, (gross) rates of growth γ are computed as
γo =
µ
g (pe)
g (po)
¶μ+η
; γe =
1
γo
.
The above computations highlight some of the more subtle aspects of patience in our
model. Consider, for the sake of argument, that a two-cycle equilibrium exists with pe < po.
(πΛ− 1) /π, (1− ϕ)Γ, which is obtained by finding the minimum value of p such that g (Λ− Γ (ϕ+ πp)) =
1. That value is (πΛ− 1) /π. The upper limit of the interval (1− ϕ)Γ is then obtained by evaluating the
right-hand side of (10) at (πΛ− 1) /π.
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This means the choice of patience capital of a young parent in odd dates is greater than that
of a parent at even dates (so a generation born in odd dates will be more patient than those
born in even dates). These odd-generation children, in turn, find each unit of investment
in their own education to be more productive; hence, they spend fewer resources to instill
patience in their children. Due to the timing of production in this model, output will be
high in odd dates and low in even dates (so the growth rate in even dates will be greater
than one in even dates and less than one in odd dates). In short, generations coming of age
with less patience capital invest more in the productive capacity of their children, while
those with greater patience find it prudent to invest more in their own productive capacity.
The following provides a numerical example of such cycle equilibria:
Example 1 Let g (p) = ϕ + πp; v (β) = β; π = 0.25; ϕ = 0.16; μ = 1; η = 1; θ = 1;
σ = 1; w = 2; A = 1; y = 8.
A steady state for this economy obtains with a value for patience capital p∗ = 1.68
and discount factor β∗ = 0.58. A two-period cycle equilibrium also obtains, with pe = 0.73
and po = 2.63; that is, with βe = 0.3425, and βo = 0.8175, respectively. Additionally, as
shown above, a two-period cycle equilibrium exists for any initial p 6= p∗ in the interval
(0,Λ− Γg (0)) = (0, 3.36) .
Our discussion above imposes a number of restrictions on the model’s primitives, per-
haps leaving the impression such two-period cycles rest on a strict knife-edge case, Γg0 = 1
— a suﬃcient condition. Of course, cycles obtain under far less restrictive conditions, as
the following example illustrates.
Example 2 Let g (p) = ϕ+ πpα; v (β) = β; α = 0.8; π = 0.48; ϕ = 0.16; μ = 1; η = 1;
θ = 0.9; σ = 0.9; w = 2; A = 1; y = 9.5.
In this example, pe = 1.3058, po = 1.9719, βe = 0.7542, and βo = 0.9863, with a steady
state p∗ = 1.6234 and β∗ = 0.8673. Here, the slope at the steady state is in a neighborhood
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of −1, i.e., −1.0046. The growth rate, γt = ht+1/ht, in the steady state is 1, while in the
cycle equilibrium γe = 1.6564 and γo = 0.6037. Recall, pt−1 is the amount of patience
capital a young parent at date t receives from her parents; those born on odd dates will
have higher eﬀective human capital and are capable of producing a lot when old (also an
odd date), hence the transition from odd to even dates exhibits a low (negative) rate of
net growth.
4 Conclusions
Patience, as Rousseau notes, is bitter, but its fruit is sweet. This paper explores a simple
model in which the sacrifices and rewards for cultivating patience are intergenerational
in nature. The basic tenets of the model rest on two premises which, we feel, are fairly
non-controversial: a) patience, like most any other factor, requires a commitment of real
resources to acquire, and b) patience enhances human capital and the ability of individuals
to acquire it.
In our set-up, parents commit resources to instill patience in their children. This,
in turn, has two eﬀects, both of which promote human capital acquisition. A forward-
looking child is more keen to make future investment (as an adult) in human capital rather
than increase current consumption. Secondly, by raising the marginal return to education,
patience enhances the investment in human capital and oﬀers the adult further incentive
to invest more in learning. Interestingly, these two eﬀects can produce intergenerational
equilibrium cycles in patience, as the adult chooses to enhance her own human capital at the
expense of investing in greater patience capital for her child. Such cycle equilibria possess
some potential to explain why parents with little human capital sometimes produce high
human capital progeny, who in turn, have children that exhibit lackluster talents. Loosely
speaking, such equilibria can also address why second-generation immigrants often earn
substantially more than those of the first and the third generations in their lineage.
To keep the analysis manageable, we assumed parents receive a warm glow from in-
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vestment in their child’s patience. This assumption could easily be replaced by altruistic
preferences. Additionally, the model assumes that investment in a child’s patience does
not ‘bear fruit’ until much later in life. Both are open to more critical scrutiny — however,
we conjecture that alternative formulations are likely to increase the complexity of the
intergenerational patience dynamics, rather than reduce it.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Part (i): Diﬀerentiate both sides of (4) to get³
θv00 (g (pt))
¡
g0 (pt)
¢2
+ θv0 (g (pt)) g00 (pt)
´
dpt = −φu00 (y − φet − pt) det−u00 (y − φet − pt) dpt.
Solving, we get:
e0 (pt) = −
³
θv00 (g (pt)) (g0 (pt))2 + θv0 (g (pt)) g00 (pt)
´
+ u00 (y − φet − pt)
φu00 (y − φet − pt)
< 0
Since
φe0 (pt) = −
³
θv00 (g (pt)) (g0 (pt))2 + θv0 (g (pt)) g00 (pt)
´
u00 (y − φet − pt)
− 1,
Part (ii) follows immediately, since
∂
∂pt
(pt + φe (pt)) = 1 + φe0 (pt)
= −
³
θv00 (g (pt)) (g0 (pt))2 + θv0 (g (pt)) g00 (pt)
´
u00 (y − φet − pt)
< 0
where the latter inequality follows from the concavity assumptions on v (·) and g (·).
Proofs of other parts of the lemma are provided in the main text. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1
Let LHS (p) ≡ φu0 (y − φe (p)− p) andRHS ≡ wg (p)u0 (wh (e (p) ; g (p)))h1 (e (p) ; g (p)) .
Diﬀerentiating LHS, we have:
LHS0 (p) = −φu00 (y − φe (p∗)− p∗)
¡
φe0 (p) + 1
¢
≤ 0,
with strict inequality over (0, y∗), using Part (i) of Lemma 1, and the concavity of u (·) .
From Part (ii) of Lemma 1, lim
p→y∗
LHS (p) > 0. From Part (iii) of Lemma 1, lim
p→0
LHS (p) =
∞.
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Figure 2: Steady-State in Patience Capital
Diﬀerentiating RHS, we have
RHS0 (p) = wu0 (wh (e (p) ; g (p)))h1 (e (p) ; g (p)) g0 (p)
+w2g (p)u00 (wh (e (p) ; g (p))) (h1 (e (p) ; g (p)))2 e0 (p)
+w2g (p)u00 (wh (e (p) ; g (p)))h1 (e (p) ; g (p))h2 (e (p) ; g (p)) g0 (p)
+wg (p)u0 (wh (e (p) ; g (p)))h11 (e (p) ; g (p)) e0 (p)
+wg (p)u0 (wh (e (p) ; g (p)))h12 (e (p) ; g (p)) g0 (p) .
The term above is positive everywhere if h (e (p) ; g (p)) is nonincreasing in p; that is, if
h1 (e (p) ; g (p)) e0 (p)+h2 (e (p) ; g (p)) g0 (p) ≤ 0. This holds, trivially, if h2 ≡ 0. In this case,
there exists a unique steady state in the interval (0, y∗), since lim
p→y∗
wg (p)u0 (wh (e (p) ; g (p)))h1 (e (p) ; g (p))→
∞ as e (p)→ 0 (see Figure 2).
More generally, RHS0 (p) may not be increasing over the entire domain of p, and
especially in a neighborhood of p = 0 if lim
p→0
h2 (e (p) ; g (p)) g0 (p) = ∞, i.e., g (p) has the
limit condition lim
p→0
g0 (p) = ∞. However, since g (0) > 0 [see A3] we have lim
p→0
RHS (p)
<∞. Additionally, lim
p→y∗
RHS (p) =∞ follows from A4 and Part (ii) of Lemma 1. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 3
Given po, pe = Λ− Γg (po) . We need to show po = Λ− Γg (pe) . We have:
Λ− Γg (pe) = Λ− Γ (ϕ+ π (Λ− Γg (po)))
= Λ− Γϕ− πΓΛ+ (πΓ)Γg (po)
= Λ− Γϕ− πΓΛ+ (πΓ)Γ (ϕ+ πpo)
= Λ− Γϕ− πΓΛ+ (πΓ)Γϕ+ (πΓ)2 po
= po
since, by assumption, the slope of the law of motion is −1, or equivalently, g0Γ = 1, i.e.,
πΓ = 1.¥
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